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TRUSTS AND ESTATES-TRENDS IN THE LAW: 1941-1945 (A SERVICE FOR RETURNING VETERANs)*-In every generation there are some
judicial decisions so revolutionary that any summary of developments
in the law, regardless of its author or of its brevity, would include them.
Such cases as Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and Williams v. North Carolina will fall into this category no matter who lines up the materials.
But such avulsive changes rarely if ever occur in the law of Trusts and
Estates; 1 and it is anybody's guess to determine the significant aspects
of the day-to-day accretions which actually take place. Thus, the writer
has no illusions that he is singling out the trends as one would pick red
roses froin a bouquet of red and white. Rather he is like the columnist
who names the all-American football team and hopes that at least
fifty per cent of his nominees will agree with those selected by other
self-appointed experts. However, there is one development in the field
of Trusts and- Estates which does not quite fall into this category.
Whatever else one may say, he is certain to regard as outstanding the
trend since 1942 in the direction of the releasability of powers of appointment. With this prelude, we shall proceed to summarize as many
of the developments in the law of Trusts and Estates as can be contained
within the limits of an average law review comment.2
MAGILL, TAXABLE lNcoME, rev. ed., 26 (1945).
GuTHMANN & DouGALL, CoRPORATE FINANCIAL PoLICY 519 (1942). A
study of the cases discussed in this note is also illustrative of this point.
89 It is recognized that the problem herein discussed presents only a single phase
of the whole complex subject of double taxation.
81

88

* See note*, p. 797, supra.
1 By the law of Trusts and Estates is meant that body of law included in the
courses in Trusts and Estates and in Fiduciary Administration at the University of
Michigan. That is to say, this survey deals with Wills, Future Interests, Trusts and the
Administration of Decedents' Estates and Trust Estates.
2 For the reader who desires a fuller treatment, reference is made to Scott, "The
Law of Trusts, 1941-1945," 59 HARv. L. REy. 157 (1945); to the ANNUAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN LAw, which is being brought out by the New York University School of
Law; to the pocket supplements in BoGERT ON TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, Sco'IT ON

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 44

The development in the law of release of powers just referred to
will serve as a point of beginning. Ten years ago the American Law
Institute was at the parting of the ways in stating the law of release of
powers of appointment. The American law was still in a state of uncertainty. Following English trends, and the policy of keeping property
freely alienable, it could have been said that all powers of appointment are releasable except powers in trust.3 Or, following the theories
of John Chipman Gray,4 and the proposition that the one consideration
of policy is the will of the donor, special powers could, with some exceptions, have been declared to be unreleasable. The Institute took the
latter view. 5 But in r 942 new provisions in the federal estate tax law for
the first time imposed that tax on the devolution of property subject to
appointment by donees of general testamentary powers and even of
some special testamentary powers. 6 This and subsequent· federal legislation provided, however, that donees might, within a certain period of
time, release powers of appointment and tlius avoid the tax. As a
result, there was a sudden rush to secure the release of powers. Legal
advisors of representatives of accumulated wealth, who had so recently
- alligned themselves in support of the will of the dead hand and the
irreleasability of powers, now found themselves exploring every legal
possibility to secure the release of powers and thus effectuate tax economies. If the American common law had been stated too strictly in the
direction of irreleasability of powers to permit all that was desired,
then relief by legislation had to be sought. Thus, we witness the
phenomenon of legislation on the release of powers of appointment
enacted in more than a score of states. 7 Some of these statutes are very
TRUSTS and PAGE ON WILLS; and to the annual reports of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association on Trust and Probate
Decisions, Trust and Probate Legislation and Trust and Probate Literature. These
reports are published as a part of the annual reports of the Section, and are also summarized in TRUSTS AND EsTATES as follows: 73 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 444, 445, 455
(1941); 75 id. 297, 300, 3II (1942); 77 id. 237, 246, 251 (1943); 79 id. 343,
349,'355 (1944); 82 id. 81, 92, 99 (1946).
Attention is also called to the following important treatises in this field of law
which were published during the period under consideration: 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT (1944); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed. (1942); PAGE,
WILLS, lifetime ·ed. ( I 94 I) •
8
The writer contended for this position many years ago. See Simes, "Powers in
Trust and the Termination of Powers by the Donee," 37 YALE L.J. 63, 211 (1927).
4
Gray, "Release and Discharge of Powers," 24 HARv. L. REv. 511 (1911).
5
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 335 (1940).
·
6
56 Stat. L. 942, c. 619, § 403, 26 U.S.C. (1940) § 8II(f), as amended, and
see H.J. Res. 206, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1945).
1
Ala. Laws (1945) Act 67; Cal. Laws (1945) c. 3_18; Colo. Laws (1945) c.
146; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1943 Supp.) §§ 681g to 685g; Fla. Laws (1945) c. 23007;
Ga. Laws (1945) No. 348; I Ill. Laws (1943) p. 6; Iowa Acts (1943) c. 251; Ky.
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sweeping and provide for the release of all kinds of powers of appointment, even powers in trust. 8 Most of them permit the partial release
of a power,1' since the donee could thereby change the taxable power
into a non-taxable power. One of the statutes in its preamble actually
refers to the tax problem as the occasion of the enactment; 10 but most
of them make no reference to tax law; and all of them have independent
significance as declarations of the law of release, entirely aside from
tax law. Some of them indicate that they are retroactive in effect or
that they are declaratory of existing law.11 But certainly they do not
declare the common law as the Institute stated it. In a word, the whole
trend of the law of release of powers has been reversed over night by
the impact of a new provision in the tax laws.
To anyone who has struggled with various editions of the New
York powers of appointment statutes of I 828, the new Minnesota statute on powers, enacted in 1943,12 comes as a pleasing substitute. Here
we find leading aspects of the law of powers clearly codified chiefly
along common law lines. States like Michigan, which are troubled
with statutory adaptations of the New York law of powers, may well
take a leaf from the book of the Minnesota legislators. It is true, this
legislation includes nothing on the release of powers. But on the whole
it covers a surprisingly large part of the law of powers in a clear and
comprehensible manner.
A slight trend in the direction of returning to the common law rule
against perpetuities, in jurisdictions which have departed from it, seems
discernible. Indiana adopted a statute which expressly establishes the
Acts (1944) c. 14; Md. Laws (1943) c. 870; Mass. Acts (1943) c. 152; Mich. Pub.
Acts, 1945, No. 296, p. 509; N.J. Laws (1943) c. 57; N.Y. Laws (1943) c. 476;
N.C. Laws (1943) c. 665; Ohio Laws (1943), amended S.B. 271, p. 408; Pa. Laws
(1943) No. 334, p. 797, as amended by Pa. Laws (1945) No. 431; R.I. Acts (1943)
c. 1348, p. 200, as amended by R.I. Acts (1944) ·c. 1486, p. 182; S.D. Laws (1945)
c. 344; Va. Acts (1944) c. 63; Wis. Laws (1943) c. 513. See, also, Ind. Laws (1945)
c. 258 dealing with renunciation of powers.
8
Thus the Michigan act, Mich. Pub. Acts (1945) No. 296, defines a power
to include "any power • • • whether vested, contingent or conditional, and whether
classified in law or known as a power in gross, a power appendant, a power appurtenant,
a collateral power, a general, special or limited power, an exclusive or non-exclusive
power, or otherwise, and irrespective of ••. whether the power be in trust or otherwise." It then provides that the donee of a power may either release it completely or
as to any property which is subject thereto, as to any one or more of the objects thereof,
or in any other respect. Some of the statutes, however, except powers in trust. See Ky.
Acts (1944) c. 14.
' See note 8, supra.
10
Mass. Acts (1943) c. 152.
11
See, for example, Ga. Laws (1945) No. 348.
12
Minn. Laws (1943) c. 322.
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common law rule in that state.18 In the new Oklahoma Trusts Act, a
rule approximating the common law rule against perpetuities appears
to be stated in one section,14 although the language is that of suspension
of the aboslute power of alienation. However, this provision would
seem to apply only to beneficial interests in trusts.15
_ •
A mooted question as to the applicability of the rule against per..:
petuities and related rules to an optional method of settlement of a
life insurance contract was settled by the case of Holmes v. John Han, cock MutUtfl Life Insurance Company. 16 The optional settlement plan
agreed upon provided that the insured was to leave the amount of the
policy on deposit with the insurance company and the latter was to make
payments as stipulated in the agreement. These payments might continue beyond two lives in being, the limit, in most cases, for the suspension of the absol~te power of alienation under New York law. The
court held that the rules as to the suspension of the absolute power of
alienation are inapplicable to such a settlement, since the transaction
does not create a trust but rather established the relation of debtor and ·
creditor between the insurance company and the benefi.ciaries.11
In the case of Gertman v. Burdick,18 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals determined that a provision in the terms of a trust for the
accumulation of income is not invalid if it is limited to continue no
longer than lives in being and twenty-one years. The opinion contains
a full and satisfactory discussion of the question. While the conclusion
reached by the court had long been said to be the American law on this
subject, it had also been suggested that the common law establish a
shorter period in restricting accumulations than is established in restricting perpetuities.19
Is there any rule, other than the rule against perpetuities, which re18 Ind. Acts (1945) c. 216. The same chapter also contains detailed provisions
restricting the accumulation of income.
u Okla. Laws (1941) p. 250. Section 47 of the Oklahoma Trust Act deals with
the matter of perpetuities.
'
15 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, p. 2799 (1944).
16 288 N.Y. 106, 41 N.E. (2d) 909 (1942).
17 The decision in this case also involves the broader question as to whether an
optional settlement arrangement such as this creates a trust or a debt. See Land, "Life
Insurance Option Settlements-Trusts or Debts," 42 CoL. L. REV. 32 (1942);
56 HARv. L. REV. II47 (1943); In re Nires, 290 N.Y. 78, 48 N.E. (2d) 268
(1943); 145 A.L.R. 1368 at 1374 (1943).
18 123 F. (2d) 924 (1941), cert. den., 315 U.S. 824, 62 S. Ct. 917 (1942).
The case is noted in 41 MICH, L. REV. 188 (1942).
19 ln general, see 2 SIMES, FUTURE 'INTERESTS, § 589 (1936), as to various
views. In the note on the decision in the principal case in the court below, in 40 CoL.
L. REV. 1430 (1940), a shorter period than that of the rule against perpetuities is said
to be desirable.
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stricts the period during which a trust may be indestructible? 20 The
authorities on this question were so few at the time that the fourth
volume of the Property Restatement was published that it was necessary to leave many aspects of this question unanswered. 21 The recent
decision in Wechter v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 22 while it
adds one more case to the list which indicate that there is a rule restricting the indestructibility of private trusts, does not tell us what the
rule is. In that case land was leased for business purposes for ninetynine years, and the reversionary interest was conveyed to a trustee to
hold for the benefit of the holders of land trust certificates representing
some I 2 75 shares in the beneficial interest of the trust. In a suit in
which termination of the trust was sought, it was contended that the
provision permitting the trust to endure for ninety-nine years was
against public policy. The court, however, held that this provision was
valid, pointing out that the trust was not indestructible, since, by its
terms, it could be terminated on the request of three-fourths of the
certificate holders.
In a few states statutes 23 have been enacted exempting pension,
profit sharing, stock bonus and annuity plans for employees from the
operation of the rule against perpetuities, the rule as to the suspension
of the power of alienation and the rule as to accumulations. The demand for such legislation seems to be due primarily to the fact that,
under certain circumstances, amounts expended for such plans may be
deducted from corporate income in computing the federal tax and the
income from the trust is exempt from the tax. 24 Since such plans are
commonly classed as non-charitable, and since, to come within the provisions of the federal legislation, no part of the trust can revert to the
employer corporation, it is difficult to set up an entirely satisfactory
trust without violating one or more of these rules. For this reason, legislation exempting such trusts from these rules appears to be justified.
A recent Indiana case 25 adds one more to the brief list of cases which
20 In general, on this question see I BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 218
(1935); I ScoTr, TRUSTS, § 62.10 (1939). Of course, the case of Gertman v. Burdick, (C.C.D.C. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 924, just discussed, is really an authority for the
validity of an indestructible trust which may last for lives in being and twenty-one
yean.
21
See 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 381 and caveat thereto (1936).
22 385 Ill. III, 52 N.E. (2d) 157 (1944), discussed in Hatfield, "Perpetuities
in Land Trusts," 40 ILL. L. REv. 84 (1945).
28
Del. Laws (1944-45) c. 224; Mo. Laws (1943) p. 716; N.C. Laws (1945)
c. 8; R.I. Acts (1943) c. 1346, p. 197.
24
See 26 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 23 (p) and 165. Numerous articles on pension
trusts are included in the bibliographies referred to in note 2, supra.
25
Rouse v. Paidrick, 221 Ind. 5·17, 49 N.E. (2d) 528 (1943).
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support the view of the American Law Institute 26 to the effect that
contingent remainders are no longer destructible by merger. The case
is particularly interesting in that the merger in question took place, if
at all, by virtue of a conveyance in r 878; and, therefore, the court was
deciding that there was no destructibility rule in Indiana at that date.
The moribund rule in Shelley's case still furnishes the subject
matter for litigation in a few states, in spite of the fact that the long list
of jurisdictions which have, <!,bolished it still increases.21 In Lydick v.
Tate, 28 testator devised real estate to his daughter for her life or during
widowhood, and provided that "at her death or remarriage the said
land shall descend to her heirs." The daughter was a widow at the time
the will was made, but remarried before the death of the testator. It
was held that the rule in Shelley's case was applicable and that the
daughter took a fee simple. Although this decision follows an earlier
Illinois case,29 it is inconsistent with the position taken by the American
Law Institute. 30
In National Shawmut Bank 'V. Joy, 31 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts refused to apply the worthier title doctrine to an
equitable limitation in remainder to the heirs of the settlor, contained
in an inter vivas trust instrument which set up a trust in personal property. Had this doctrine been applied, the remainder would have been
void and a reversionary interest would have been left in the settlor.
Following the Property Restatement, 32 and the New York decisions,83
the court took the position that, though the rule could be applied to
an equitable remainder in personal property, it was a rule of construction, and its application was prevented in this case by the showing of a
contrary intent.
The recent session laws of the various states abound in legislation
resulting from the effect of the war on the law of wills and of fiduciary
administration. Without attempting to list all this varied body of legislation, it is sufficient to say that statutes may be found which are de'signed to accomplish the following objectives: permitting minors in the
armed forces to execute wills; 34 permitting holographic, unattested
2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 240 (1936).
See, for example, Fla. Laws (1945) c. 23126; Ohio Laws (1941) p. 348.
28 380 Ill. 616, 44 N.E. (2d) 583 (1942), noted in 43 CoL. L. REV. 398
(1943); IO UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 344, 145 A.L.R. 1216 at 1227 (1943).
29 Belleville Sav. Bank v. Aneshaensel, 298 Ill. 292, 131 N.E. 682 (1921).
so 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 230, comment e (1936).
31 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d} II3 (1944), noted in 43 MicH. L. REv. 976
(1945).
32 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 314 (1940).
33 The leading case is Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298, 165
N.E. 454 (1929).
34 See, for example, Ind. Acts ( 1945) c. 8.
26

27
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wills by members of the armed forces; 85 providing for the proof of
wills where attesting witnesses are in the armed forces; 86 providing
for problems arising from fiduciaries entering the armed forces, by suspending their powers and by substituting other fi.ducaries. 87 Attention
should also be called to the Model War Service Validation Act, recently
promulgated by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, which has been enacted with some modifications in Wisconsin.88
The old question, when is an instrument or transaction testamentary so that the formalities for the execution of wills must be complied
with, has recently appeared in varied forms. There is some conflict
of authority on the question whether a government bond made payable
"to A, or on his death to B," or in which similar language is used,
should be regarded as testamentary in character. 89 If it is to be so regarded, then the proceeds of the bond would belong to A's executor
or administrator, since the formalities for the execution of will have not
been complied with. Or even if they have been complied with by a
separate instrument, the proceeds of the bond would, under that theory,
be subject to A's debts. In Franklin Washington Trust Company v.
Beltram,4° it was held that the transaction is a contract in favor of a
third party beneficiary, and that it is not a testamentary transaction.
This is clearly the better view. Certainly a contractual arrangement is
not testamentary merely because the time of performance is the d~th
of one of the parties.
If property is transferred to a trustee to pay the income to the
settlor during his life, and the settlor reserves the power to revoke or
amend the trust and to dispose of the estate, it is commonly held that
a valid inter vivos trust is created and that the transaction is not testamentary. 41 The recent decisions in the cases of National Shawmut Bank
v. Joy,4 2 and Rose v. Union Guardian Trust Company,4 3 support this
view. But if the settlor retains still more control over the property,
it is sometimes held that the transaction is testamentary. In Central
85

See, for example, N.Y. Laws (1942) c. 688.
See, for example, N.J. Laws (1945) c. 210, p. 709.
87
See, for example, Md. Laws (1943) cc. 288 and 290. Ohio Laws (1943-44)
P· 356.
88
Wis. Laws (1945) c. 463. The Model Act is printed in l C.C.H. TRUSTS AND
ESTATES LAW SERV. (4th ed.)
9701 to 9721.
89
See the cases collected in 1 C.C.H. TRUSTS AND EsTATEs LAw SERV. (4th ed.)
1f 6536. In a few states are found statutes on this subject. See, for example, Wash.
Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1943) § n548-61.
40
133 N.J. Eq. II, 29 A. (2d) 854 (1943).
41
See l ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 57.1 (1939).
42
315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 113 (1944). ~s 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W. (2d) 458 (1942).
86

mr
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Trust Company v. Watt,44 the transaction in which it was sought to set
up an inter vivos trust involved substantially the elements stated abovie,
with the addition of a provision that the trustee was to manage and reinvest the estate in accordance with the settlor's written direction. The
court held that the trust was valid, although it was not executed in
accordance with the requirements for the execution of wills. However,
three of the seven judges dissented, and a fourth, in a concurring
opinion, indicated that he decided in favor of the validity of the trust
because the point as to its testamentary character had not been properly
raised so as to be considered on the appeal. It should be pointed out,
however, that the history of amendable living trusts in Ohio has been
unique,45 and that, as pointed out in a later Ohio decision in which this
case was discussed, a subsequent change in Ohio legislation permitted
a more favorable attitude toward the revocable trust.46
In 1937, in the case of Newman v. Dore,47 the New York Court
of Appeals had before it a question involving an inter vivos trust, constituting substantially all the property of the settlor, which he had set
up a short time before his death. By the terms of the trust he reserved
the income for life, the power to revoke the trust and the power to
control the action of the trustee. The court held that the subject matter
of the trust should be treated as a part of the settlor's estate for the
purpose of determining his widow's statutory distributive share. The
reason given by the court was that the transaction was "illusory," by
which apparently was meant that the settlor had retained so many
interests in the property up to the time of his death that, for purposes
of the widow's statutory share, he should be treated as if he had retained
them all. This doctrine seems to be spreading,48 and has been followed
in the recent Ohio cas~ of Bolles v. Toledo Trust Company.49
A recent decision interpreting the New York statute as to the
validity of devises to attesting witnesses is that of In re Walter's Estate. 50 In that case both of the attesting witnesses were legatees and
were in the state of New York when the testator died. Shortly there44 139 Ohio St.· 50, 38 N.E. (2d) 185 (1941), noted in 41 MrcH. L. REv.
191 (1942), and 9 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 499 (1942). See Goldman and DeCamp,
"When is a Trust not a Trust?" 16 CmN. L. REV. 191 (1942).
45 This history is summarized in the article by Goldman and DeCamp, cited note
44, supra. .
.
.
46 Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E. (2d) 381 (1944),
157 A.L.R. II64 at u84 (1945).
47 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937), .II2 A.L.R. 643 at 6f9 (1938).
48 See comment: Smith, "The Present Status of 'Illusory Trusts,' " 44 M1cH L.
REV. 151 (1945).
49 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E. (2d) 381 (1944), 157 A.L.R. u64 at 1184
(1945) •
.·50 285 N.Y. 158, 33 N.E. (2d) 72 (1941).
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after, however, one of them removed to another state and remained
there until the will was probated. It was held that, under the existing
statute, the witness who remained in New York lost his legacy, but the
one who left the state did not. The court justified its conclusion on the
ground _that the statute invalidated the legacy of a witness if the will
"can not be proved without the testimony of such witness"; that, since
the statute permitted the proof of the will by one witness when the
other was out of the state, the testimony of the witness who had removed from the state was not necessary to prove the will. That result
was evidently deemed unsatisfactory as the statute as to the validity of
legacies to attesting witnesses was changed by the legislature the following year / 1
In the law of trusts, developments by judicial decision have been
comparatively few. In Tuttle v. Union Bank and Trust Company,5~
an action was brought against the trustee of an express trust in his individual capacity for services rendered the beneficiary in accordance with
the terms of the trust. A judgment dismissing the action was affirmed
on the ground that the trustee should have been sued in his representative capacity. This conclusion is clearly contrary to common law
doctrines, 68 and can perhaps be justified in part on the basis of the
Montana statute. But it also represents a clear departure from the rule
that the trustee must ,be sued in his individual capacity in an action at
law in such a case.
In the absence of statute it had previously been held that, if a
testator directs his executor or trustee to purchase an .annuity for a
named person, that person can elect to take the price of the annuity
instead. 64 That this rule resulted in the defeat of the testator's intent
and was inconsistent with the American doctrine recognizing indestructible trusts, must be conceded. Hence, the recent case of Berry v.
Bank,56 which does not permit the beneficiary to elect to take the price
of his annuity, is to be commended.
The rule is everywhere recognized that a spendthrift trust cannot
be set up for the benefit of the settlor, which will be immune to the
claims of his own creditors. This would appear to be because the settlor
cannot be permitted to put out of the reach of his own creditors in this
manner property which they could have reached before the trust was
set up. Where one other than the settlor is beneficiary, the property
was not subject to the beneficiary's creditors before the trust was set up;
hence it is thought proper to create the immunity by means of the trust.
61

N.Y. Laws (1942) c. 622.

ts2 II2 Mont. 568, II9 P. (2d) 884 (1941), -139 A.L.R. 127 at 134 (1942).
tss Sae TRUSTS, RESTATEMENT, § 262 (1935).
ts4 See 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 346 (1939); 41 M1cH. L. REV. 276 (1942).
!SIS

133 N.J. Eq. 164, 31 A. (2d) 203 (1943).
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On the basis of this reasoning it could be argued that, if a person owned
property which could not be reached by his creditors, he should be able
to transfer it on a valid spendthrift trust for his own benefit. Thus, it
is arguable that, since land held in a tenancy by the entireties is not
subject to the creditors of either tenant, it should be possible to create a
valid spendthrift trust from it for the benefit of the tenants by the
entirety. This question was before the Pennsylvania court in the case of
Murphey v. C.I.T. Corporation, 56 in which it was held that the spendthrift provision was invalid as against a creditor of the survivor of the
two settlors.
In no branch, of the law of trusts has there been more development
than in the matter of allocating benefits and burdens between life tenant and remainderman. First of all it should be pointed out that the
so-called Pennsylvania rule as to the allocation of stock dividends is no
longer the law in Pennsylvania. In 1945 the legislature of that state
adopted the uniform principal and income act, 57 which declares the
Massachusetts rule to the effect that stock dividends go to the remainderman and not to the life tenant. It would seem that this is a
strong indication of the modern trend in favor of the Massachusetts
rule. 58
In McKechnie v. Springfield, 59 a question of the allocation of the
proceeds of a mortgage salvaging operation was considered. The mortgage investment was unproductive and a foreclosure took place in which
the trustee acquired the land; After the death of the life tenant, the
· land was sold by the trustee, the purchaser paying part cash and giving
a purchase money mortgage. The court determined, first, that the
proceeds of the salvaging operation should eventually be apportioned
between life tenant and remainderman even though the sale took place
after the life tenant's death, and, second, that since the sale was not for
cash, the salvaging operation would be regarded as incomplete and
the allocation would be postponed.
An interesting question arises as to the allocation of the proceeds
•,of those government bonds, such as "series E" bonds,59a in which the
purchaser pays seventy-five per cent of the face of the bond, and at its
347 Pa. 591, 33 A. (2d) 16 (1943), noted in 92 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 216
(1943).
57 Pa. Laws (1945) Act. 1,71.
58 In addition to Pennsylvania, the following states have enacted the Uniform
Principal and Income Act since 1940: California, Illinois, Oklahoma. See 9 U.L.A.
(1946, Supp.) § 2, p. II5.
59.3h Mass. 406, 41 N.E. (2d) 557 (1942).
59a Under present governmental regulations, series "E" bonds cannot be registered in the name of a fiduciary as such. But there are other similar savings bonds
which may,be so registered. See U.S. Code of Fed. Reg. (1944 Supp.) tit. 31, c. 2,
§§ 315.4 and 315-5.
56
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maturity ten years later receiyes the face of the bond without interest.
Should the bond be regarded as entirely capital, since no interest is
paid? If so, is it a proper investment for trusts involving life tenants
and remaindermen? In Will of Wehner, 60 the Wisconsin court approved such an investment, and determined that the entire increment
over cost price would belong to the life tenant. The question then
arose: Would the life tenant be required to wait until the bond matured
_in order to receive this amount? Answering this question in the negative, the court said: "In this case the trustee had funds belonging to the
corpus on hand. The trustee proposed to invest these funds and to purchase from the life tenant the interest due the life tenant. The fund
thus expended would be restored to the corpus whenever the bonds
were matured or were redeemed." 61 In other words, the trustee was
permitted to advance income out of other corpus of the esta~e.
In Matter of Pennock,62 the court was faced with a question of allocating between life tenant and remainderman in a testamentary trust,
rights of the testator to commissions on renewal life insurance premiums. Should these contracts with the respective insurance companies
be regarded as wasting assets and allocated on that basis? The court
held that the proceeds of these contracts should be apportioned on
the basis of unproductive "capital assets" and not as wasting assets. 63
One of the recent developments in the law of fiduciary administration has been the trend toward broader investment powers of fiduciaries. While it is not possible, within the scope of this comment, to
refer to all the statutes and decisions which indicate this trend, attention
is directed to two recent articles by Mr. Mayo A. Shattuck, of the Boston bar, in which the authorities showing this trend are set out and discussed. In a recent number of the Boston University Law Review,64
he writes on "An Important Development in the Feld of Fiduciary
Administration," and in a still later article in the same magazine, he
discusses "The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments." 65
60

238 Wis. 557, 300 N.W. 241 (1941).
ld. at 562.
62 285 N.Y. 475, 35 N.E. (2d) 177 (1941), noted in 42 CoL. L. REV. 166
( 1942). The court stated the basis of apportionment as follows, "This leads to the
conclusion that upon payment of each commission to the trustee there shall be apportionment therefrom of capital and income, for the successive life tenants, in accordance
with the formula prescribed in section 241 of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts
(Matter of Rowland, 273 N.Y. 100, no), at the average rate earned upon legal
investments from the date of testator's death to the dates of the various payments."
285 N.Y. 475 at 486.
63
See TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 239, 240 and 241 (1935).
64
24 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 80 (1944).
65
25 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 307 (1945).
61
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Attention should be called to some recent cases concerned with
liability of fiduciaries for breach' of trust,66 important among which is
City Bank Farmers Trust Company v. Cannon. 67 In that case cash and
securities were transferred by deed of trust to the City Bank Farmers
Trust Company. The terms of the trust provided that the settlor was
to receive the income for her life, and upon her death the estate was
to be divided into five equal shares, each share to be held in trust for
one of five children. The settlor reserved the right to revoke the trust
in whole or in part at any time. Included in the estate were shares in
the National City Bank. Later the trustee increased the holdings of
National City Bank stoc}c with the approval of the settlor. It is conceded that the investments were proper. Subsequently, however, the
affiliation of the National City Bank with the Trust Company was
accomplished by the National City Bank acquiring all the shar~ of the
Trust Company. During the depression there were losses to the corpus
of the trust due to the depreciation in market value of the National
City Bank stock. The infant beneficiaries of the frust sought, in this
action, to surcharge the trustee for this loss. In giying its opinion the
court declared that the trustee was in a position of·divided loyalty, since
its interest in the National City Bank might lead it to one conclusion as
to a sale of the stock, while its interest as trustee of the trust which
held National City Bank stock might lead it to reach another conclusion. The trustee was not surcharged, however, because the settlor had
approved the transaction and urged the retention of the. stock; and
since she had the power to amend or revoke the trust, her action
estopped the remaindermen also. That the court was right in concluding that the action of the settlor in approving t11,e retention of the
investment bound the remaindermen, cannot be doubted. 08 However,
it may be thought that the court was pressing the principle of divided
loyalties too far. 69
The Uniform Trusts Act has been enacted in three jurisdictions in
the period under consideration.70 Texas has also enacted a Trusts Act
66 See the discussion of these cases in Niles and Schwartz, "Breach of TrustRecent Developments," 20 N.Y.UNiv. L. Q. 165 (1944).
67 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E. (2d) 674 (1943).
68 See Scott, "The Effects of a Power to Revoke a Trust," 57 HARv. L. REV.
362 (1944).
'
69 See Scott, "Retention of its own Shares by a Corporate Trustee," 57 HARv.
L. REv. 601 (1944).
70 Nev. Stat (1941) c. 136; Okla. Laws (1941) p. 250; S.D. Laws (1943) c.
308.

CoMMENTS

which contains a part of the uniform act.11 It should be noted also that
some states which did not enact the Uniform Trusts Act have nevertheless enacted a provision permitting the holding in the name of
a nominee securities which are owned in a fiduciary capacity.12 Several
states have enacted common trust fund legislation, most of them following the Uniform Common Trust Fund Act in whole or in part. 73
Lewis M. Simes t
71 Texas Gen. Laws (1943) c. 148. See amendments in Texas Gen. Laws
(1945) c, 77. The act is discussed in Moorhead, "Texas Trust Act," 22 TEX. L.
REv. 123 (1944).
72 See Ky. Acts (1944) c. II; Md. Laws (1945) c. 765; N.H. Laws (1943)
c. 68; W.Va. Acts (1945) c. 28. See, in general, as to the legal problems involved in
placing stock, held in a fiduciary capacity, in the name of a nominee, Capron, ''"Nominee Registration of Fiduciary Securities," 79 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 309 (1944).
78 '.Ariz. Laws (1941) c. 35; Fla. Laws (1941) c. 20353; Ga. Laws (1943) No.
413, p. 442; Ill. Laws (1943) p. 230; Mass. Acts and Resolves (1941) c. 474; Mich.
Acts (1941) No. 174, p. 257; Ohio Laws (1943) p. 209; S.D. Laws (1941) c. 20;
Va. Acts (1944) c. 369; Wash. Laws (1943) c. 55; W.Va. Acts (1945) c. 4; Wis.
Laws (1943) c. 274.
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